Introduction
'Is democracy in crisis? This question is being posed with increasing urgency by some of the leading statesmen of the West, by columnists and scholars, and -if public opinion polls are to be trusted -even by the publics', Zbigniew Brzezinski, Director of The Trilateral Commission in his introductory note to Crozier et al. (1975) As the introductory quote illustrates, crisis talk is nothing new for Western democracies. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, social scientists across the Western world perceived a crisis of democracy. The progressive erosion of the democratic state's capacity to implement adequate policies was the underlying common thread in the different versions of this crisis talk (see Crozier et al. 1975 , Habermas 1973 , Offe 1972 . This scholarly debate on the crisis in Western democracies had triggered a large-scale investigation into the relationship between the citizens and the state in Western Europe. But when the results of this program were eventually published in the mid-1990s, the world had fundamentally changed as a result of the third wave of democratization, and the scholarly debate had moved on to problems linked to democratic transition and consolidation. Another reason why the question of the crisis of democracy had lost its urgency was the lack of clear empirical evidence in support of the claim of a progressively worsening crisis of state authority/legitimacy in Western democracies. Nor was state power unambiguously eroding in these countries. The results of the 'Beliefs in Government program' actually rather confirmed the authors' 'normality hypothesis', which they opposed to the 'crisis hypothesis': Western representative democracies proved to be perfectly capable of absorbing and assimilating growing pressure from societal problems, and the forms of political expression taken by such pressure could be understood as the normal manifestations of democracy in complex societies (Fuchs and Klingemann 1995) .
Nevertheless, the question of 'disaffected democracies' did not go away. In 2000, a follow-up study to the original Crisis of democracy was primarily preoccupied by the lack of public confidence in leaders and institutions of democratic governance (Pharr and Putnam 2000) .
The study argued that the causes for the decline of confidence did not lie in the social fabric, nor were they the result of general economic conditions. The problem, it suggested, was with government and politics themselves. In the same vein, the contributors to yet another study on 'political disaffection in contemporary democracies ' (Torcal and Montero 2006) highlighted the decisive role of politics and institutions in shaping political disaffection.
However, even if many citizens have become less satisfied with the way democracy works, research on dissatisfaction with democracy has consistently shown that support for democracy as a principle remains widespread in Europe (Klingemann 1999 , Dalton 2004 . In his more recent analysis of 2008 World Value Survey data, Klingemann (2014) confirms that the values of an overwhelming part of European citizens are congruent with democratic principles.
In the meantime, the context conditions have changed again, and since the fall of Lehman Brothers in fall 2008, it is the economic crisis of the Great Recession which has been said to threaten democracy in Europe. The question of 'the crisis of democracy' has now become the question of whether, under the conditions of economic hardship, Europeans have become less supportive of democratic principles and/or more critical of the quality of democracy in their own countries. To put this question into perspective, I shall distinguish between four regions of Europe. When it comes to the assessment of democratic support and discontent, it is important to distinguish between Northwestern Europe (NWE), Southern Europe (SE) and Central-and Eastern Europe (CEE). In addition, within CEE we should distinguish between the more or less democratic countries and the authoritarian regimes in Europe's neighborhood (Russia, Kosovo and Ukraine), for which we also have data on the relevant democratic attitudes. These four regions have different democratic legacies -the CEE countries have made their transition to democracy only in the early 1990s. Similarly, several countries of SE (Spain, Greece, Portugal, Cyprus) have been governed by authoritarian regimes until the mid1970s. Moreover, it is well known that SE and CEE countries have been hit much harder by the Great Recession and the Euro crisis than NWE. Most importantly, however, the Euro crisis had a very different political impact in the three regions, as is illustrated by Figure 1 
<Figures 1>
In NWE, majorities of the citizens have been rather satisfied with the way their national democracy works throughout the period covered (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) . The economic crisis has not substantially changed the overall pattern in these countries. By contrast, the level of satisfaction with the way national democracy works has been much lower in the CEE countries throughout the period covered, the share of those fairly/very satisfied hovering always around one third of the citizenry. The Great Recession did not change much in this 1 This indicator has been heavily criticized in the literature. Ferrín (2016: 306) has submitted this indicator to a detailed test. The good news of her test is that 'SWD seems to provide a relatively reliable measure of citizens' perceptions of how well the liberal dimension of democracy works in their country' . For our purposes, it is suboptimal that the Eurobarometer data which I use here is rather incomplete. turning to the analysis of the results.
The Europeans' overall views and evaluations of democracy
In order to simplify Easton's (1975) takes into account only the components which someone considers "extremely important".
The scale ranges from the two items considered most important across Europe (rule of law, free and fair elections) to the items considered least important (alternative partisan offers, citizens discussions, and responsibility to other European governments) ).
Moreover, this hierarchy has been shown to be more or less identical across all 29 countries of the study. In other words, the Europeans share a common understanding of the basic model of liberal democracy.
On average, Europeans consider all twelve components of the model as quite important for democracy. On the 11-point scale, the average value for all components is 8.3, and there are hardly any regional differences in this respect (see Table 1 ). On average, roughly five of the twelve components are considered 'extremely important', which corresponds to a value of 4.3 on a scale running from 0 (no element is extremely important) to 10 (all 12 components are considered extremely important). As is shown by the second column in Table 1 , there are regional differences with respect to this more appropriate measure of support for the principles of liberal democracy: Southern and Eastern Europeans are more supportive of the 5 Table A1 in the Appendix provides an overview over all the items used for the three models in this contribution.
principles of liberal democracy than North-Western Europeans. Note also, that citizens from authoritarian countries are almost as supportive of the principles of liberal democracy as the citizens in the rest of Europe.
<Table 1>
When it comes to evaluations, however, the twelve components (ranging from -5="does not apply at all" to +5="applies completely") are clearly better evaluated in NWE, where they reach an average of 1.88 compared to .68 in SE and .53 in CEE. Not unexpectedly, the Nordic countries are the ones with the best average evaluations -Sweden (2.6), Norway (2.5), Denmark (2.4) and Finland (2.3). In the three authoritarian countries in CEE, the average evaluations are worse than everywhere else and even reach negative values (=-.67).
In other words, Europeans are highly sensitive to the quality of democracy in their own country, and they know a deficient democracy when they experience it. But note that there is room for improvement even in the best performing countries, since even the Nordic countries fall considerably short of the maximum on the scale (=5).
In the second part of Table 1 , analogous data are presented for social democracy. In the case of this democratic model, the set of items in the ESS6 was limited to only two -protection against poverty and measures to reduce income inequality 6 . The index for this model of democracy just corresponds to the average raw values of the two items. As is shown, on average, these two items are considered even more important for democracy in general than the components of the liberal democracy model, above all in SE and in the authoritarian countries of CEE. In the view of the Europeans, the social democratic model complements the liberal democratic model, since the corresponding indices are correlated to the order of r=.64. The Europeans' model of democracy includes the substantive elements of social democracy, too. As the raw scores, but above all the index values show, the support for the principles of social democracy is much stronger in SE and CEE than in NWE.
The social democratic model fares much worse than the liberal democratic model when it comes to evaluation. The average evaluation of the two social-democratic elements is negative across Europe. Only in NWE, they are positively evaluated, but even in the best performing Nordic countries the average evaluation rises only slightly above +1. In SE and CEE, and most pronouncedly in the authoritarian countries, the evaluation of the social democratic components of democracy is clearly negative. When it comes to a democratic deficit in Europe at the time of the Euro crisis, it is above all a deficit in terms of the social democratic components.
The third part of Moreover, this model also tends to be seen as a complement of the basic model since the overall correlation between liberal and direct democracy amounts to r=.44. With respect to evaluations, the direct democratic model is situated in between the other two. In each region, it fares better than the social democratic model, but worse than the liberal democratic one.
The role of economic and political satisfaction for the citizens' evaluations and conceptions of democracy
The model I propose to study the effect of the crisis on the citizens' evaluations and conceptions of democracy is presented in Figure 2 . This model includes both evaluations and conceptions of democracy (support of democratic principles) as dependent variables and considers them as interdependent. As proposed previously (Kriesi and Saris 2016: 194-204) , the model assumes that conceptions and evaluations have a reciprocal effect on each other, which may be conditioned by the quality of democracy (which varies between the regionspecific groups of countries). For the present purposes, this reciprocal relationship is not at the centre of our attention, but we need to take it into account, if we want to properly estimate the effects of the economic crisis on the two aspects of democratic support. Taking this interdependent relationship into account, the model suggests that, in the short run, both evaluations and conceptions of democracy crucially depend on two types of instrumental considerations on the part of the citizens: their satisfaction with
• the performance of the economy
• the government's performance
Expected impact of performance on evaluations
Let us first consider the impact of performance on evaluations of democracy. One may expect that the citizens' evaluations of democracy directly depend on both instrumental considerations: the better the perceived performance of the economy and the government, the better probably one's evaluation of domestic democracy. The two instrumental considerations are interrelated to the extent that the satisfaction with the government's performance depends on the satisfaction with the economy and partly mediates its impact on the evaluation of democracy. In part at least, citizens attribute responsibility for the economic well-being of their country to their political authorities, i.e. to the government. This is the basic mechanism behind economic voting (Duch and Stevenson 2008, Lewis-Back and Stegmaier 2007) .
Satisfaction with the government, in turn, is expected to directly influence the citizens' assessment of how democracy works. However, citizens are unlikely to attribute all the responsibility for the economic performance to the government in place, which means that the economy can be expected to have a direct effect on the evaluation of democracy, too.
<Figure 2>
The model also includes a number of controls, some of which are directly related to the evaluation side. Thus, it is well known that citizens who have voted for the incumbent government, i.e. citizens who belong to the winners in the last elections, are more satisfied with democracy than electoral losers (Anderson et al. 2005) . Their satisfaction with the way democracy works in their country is, of course, mediated by their greater satisfaction with the incumbent government, but it is possible that they are more satisfied with democracy more generally, independently of how the current government performs. In addition, it is also well known that institutional trust heavily influences performance evaluations: trusting citizens are more likely to give the government and the democratic institutions the benefit of the doubt.
Moreover, an individual's general life satisfaction is also likely to spill over to her satisfaction with more specific aspects of life, such as the economy's or the government's performance. Finally, it is likely that one's level of education influences one's assessment of democracy: the higher one's level of education, the more critical one tends to be in terms of democratic evaluations (Norris 2011: 129-33) .
These considerations apply to all countries. However, one may expect the corresponding effects to vary according to the quality of democracy in a given country and according to the vision of democracy at stake. First, it is likely that the citizens' assessment of the economic performance of their country has a stronger impact on their evaluations of democracy in countries where the overall quality of democracy is low. As has been argued by Magalhães (2016 Magalhães ( , 2016a ) based on arguments from social psychology, when people perceive procedures as fair, allowing them voice and influence, they become more likely to discount poor performance in favour of expected future positive outcomes. They are also less likely to believe that outcomes could have been more favourable, and thus less likely to hold authorities directly responsible for negative outcomes. Moreover, if procedures are perceived as fair, material outcomes can lose importance in favour of intangible benefits. This means that we can expect a stronger impact of the economic and government performance on the evaluations of democracy in low quality democracies than in high quality democracies. I.e.
the impact of economic and government performance should be stronger in SE, CEE and especially in authoritarian countries than in NWE.
Second and related to this first point, we may expect the citizens' assessment of the economic performance of their country to have a stronger impact on the evaluations of social democracy than on the evaluations of liberal and direct democracy. This expectation is based on the fact that the social democratic model is less of a procedural and more of an outputbased model. The economic and political performance of a country is likely to have a more direct impact on output-related aspects of democracy than on purely procedural ones.
Four hypotheses summarize the expected effect of performance considerations on the evaluations of democracy:
H1: satisfaction with government and economic performance has a positive impact on the individuals' evaluation of how democracy works in their own country.
H2: the effect of satisfaction with the economy on the evaluation of how democracy works is partly mediated by satisfaction with the government.
H3: satisfaction with government and economic performance has a stronger effect on the evaluation of democracy in low quality democracies and in authoritarian regimes.
H4: satisfaction with government and economic performance has a stronger effect on the evaluation of social democracy than on the evaluation of the other two visions of democracy.
Expected impact on conceptions
As Easton (1975: 446) had already suggested, diffuse and specific support are related to the extent that diffuse support is not only based on normative beliefs, but is also 'a product of spill-over effects from evaluations of a series of outputs and of performance over a long period of time'. With respect to democratic support, this implies that the better the long-term economic performance in a democracy, the greater is not only the expected satisfaction of the citizens with their regime, but also their support of democratic principles. Conversely, as Linz The extent and direction of these contrasting effects may, in turn, again be moderated by the type and quality of the regime. According to the 'spill-over' hypothesis, good performance can be expected to enhance the support of democratic principles in democracies, but not in authoritarian countries. In the latter, good performance might on the contrary enhance the support for the authoritarian regime and undermine the support of democratic principles. Magalhães (2014: 80) has, indeed, shown that this holds true. In his study, the spill-over effects depend on the indicators used and are weak for non-democracies, but they are significant: in democracies, greater levels of performance increase diffuse support for democracy, while the opposite is the case in non-democracies.
Let me summarize these expectations in two contrasting hypotheses, plus an sub-hypothesis specifically devoted to authoritarian regimes: 
Testing the model: results
For the test of these expectations, I use a summary indicator for the citizens' ('socio-tropic') assessment of the economic situation, which simply asks about their satisfaction with the state of the economy in their own country. Responses are recorded on a 0-10 scale. Figure 3 shows how this indicator is distributed in the four regions covered by the ESS6 data -the three European regions, plus the authoritarian neighbourhood, at the time of the interviews in 2012. As this figure indicates, the NWE distribution clearly differs from the distributions in the other three regions: in NWE the citizens' assessments are skewed in a positive direction with a mean of 5.1 on the 0-10 scale. In the other three regions, the distributions are skewed in a negative direction with means of 2.9 in SE, 3.1 in authoritarian countries, and 3.4 in CEE. In SE, the modal value is 0, which illustrates the great economic pessimism that reigned in this part of Europe at the time the survey was put into the field in the midst of the Euro crisis. variable, which takes the value of 1 for electoral winners and 0 otherwise 9 . Institutional trust is a factor extracted from the battery of five trust items in the general part of the ESS 10 . Level of education is measured on a five-point scale and political interest on a four-point scale. All substantive independent variables have been recoded to the 0-1 range, which means that the estimated coefficients correspond to the maximum effect of these variables as we move from its minimum (0) to its maximum (1). With regard to the evaluations of liberal democracy, the table first shows that all performance-related effects are highly significant, and all of them have the expected positive sign:
as expected, satisfaction with governmental and economic performance increases the satisfaction with the way liberal democracy works, and vice versa. Second, as expected, too, the effects increase as we move from the higher quality democracies in NWE to the lower quality democracies in SE, CEE, and the authoritarian countries. In higher quality democracies, citizens, indeed, tend to have a less instrumental approach to liberal democracy than citizens in countries with a lower quality of democracy. Third, comparing the effects of economic and government performance, we observe that, in all the regions, the direct effects of economic performance are lower than the corresponding effects of government performance. One reason for this is that the effect of satisfaction with the economy is partly mediated by satisfaction with the government. This can be seen in Figure 4a , which presents the direct and total effects of the two performance indicators on the evaluations of liberal democracy. The effect of satisfaction with the economy increases in all regions, once we take its indirect effects into account as well: it more than doubles in SE and CEE, and it reaches almost the same order of magnitude as the effect of satisfaction with the government in authoritarian countries. The evaluation of liberal democracy appears to be particularly vulnerable to poor performance in authoritarian countries. In authoritarian countries, the maximum effect of the combined political and economic dissatisfaction is 3.4 (1.728+1.646) on the -5 to +5 scale, as compared to 1.1 (.446+.630) in NWE countries.
<Figure 4>
With regard to the conceptions of democracy, Figure 4b shows that, with two exceptions, all performance-related effects are negative. This is strong support for the 'critical citizens' hypothesis. The direct and total effects of satisfaction with the government are equally negative in NWE, SE, and CEE Europe, and the direct effects of satisfaction with the economy are even more pronouncedly negative in SE, CEE and authoritarian countries. The overall result for democracies holds. But it holds only with respect to the direct effect of economic satisfaction, which is counteracted by the indirect effect via satisfaction with government, because the latter has a negative effect on democratic conceptions. As a result, the total effect of satisfaction with economic performance is virtually zero in NWE.
The other exceptionally positive effect concerns the effect of satisfaction with government in authoritarian countries: contrary to expectations and contrary to Magalhães' results (see H5a) and for reasons I ignore, in these countries satisfaction with the government directly promotes support for democratic principles. Note, however, that this positive effect is counter-acted by an indirect negative effect so that, in the end, satisfaction with the government has hardly any effect on support for liberal democratic principles in authoritarian countries. The indirect effect operates via the evaluation of the way democracy works: in authoritarian countries, citizens who are satisfied with the government are also satisfied with the way democracy works and, therefore, less demanding in terms of democracy.
The critical citizens' hypothesis is enhanced by the fact that, not only in authoritarian countries but in all regions except SE, evaluations generally have a negative effect on conceptions: the more dissatisfied democrats are more demanding in terms of liberal democracy than the more satisfied ones. In SE, the effect is not significant. By contrast, independently of performance considerations, in all four regions the more demanding citizens tend to be more satisfied with the way liberal democracy works in their country than the less demanding ones. They generally seem to give the governments the benefit of the doubt.
Turning briefly to the effect of the control variables, they all show the expected signs. Thus, evaluations of liberal democracy are enhanced among electoral winners, especially in lower quality democracies and authoritarian countries (confirming the results of Anderson et al. 2005 ). Institutional trust improves evaluations, as does satisfaction with life (except for authoritarian countries), while higher levels of education render citizens more skeptical. The effect of institutional trust is by far the most important one, reaching levels comparable to the performance variables. As for conceptions of liberal democracy, they are enhanced by education and political interest (above all in NWE, but much less so (political interest) or not at all (education) in authoritarian countries). We also find the expected curvilinear effect of left-right ideology in all regions, but especially again in NWE. Figure 5 presents the direct and total effects of the performance indicators for social democracy 13 . As expected, both direct and total effects are even stronger for social than for liberal democracy. With respect to evaluations, the pattern of the effects is quite similar to that for liberal democracy, except that the maximum effect of the combined political and economic satisfaction now reaches up to 4.9 (2.007+2.898) and 5.0 (2.310+2.691) on the -5 to +5 scale for authoritarian and CEE countries respectively, compared to a still sizeable 2.7
(1.505+1.160) in NWE. In terms of conceptions, we find again unexpected direct positive effects of satisfaction with government on support for social democratic principles, not only in authoritarian countries, but also in the countries of other regions. However, these effects are hardly significant and are counter-acted by indirect negative effects. In total, in none of the regions does satisfaction with the government's performance have any significant effect on demands for social democracy. By contrast, satisfaction with economic performance has a very strong effect on demands for social democracy: the direct effect is enhanced indirectly to reach a total of -3.75 in CEE, -3.17 in authoritarian and -2.77 in SE countries. This is to suggest that economic (but not political) dissatisfaction leads even more to demands for social than for liberal democracy in the countries hardest hit by the crisis. The critical citizens' hypothesis is once again confirmed by the fact that dissatisfaction with the way social democracy works also enhances demands for social democracy. In the case of social democracy, the reciprocal relationship between conceptions and evaluations is mutually negative, with negative evaluations being especially meted out by the more demanding citizens. Let us note in passing that the pattern of control effects is similar to that for liberal democracy. There is only one notable difference in this respect: social democratic conceptions of democracy are much more present on the left in NWE and to some extent in SE, but not at all on the left in authoritarian countries. <Figure 5> This analysis vindicates the 'critical citizens' hypothesis and contradicts the 'spill-over'
hypothesis. It suggests that it is misleading to fear for the future of European democracies.
The anti-dote for the poor performance of contemporary European democracies in political and economic terms is not less, but more democracy, especially more social democracy -at least, this seems to be the verdict of Europeans in the shadow of the Great Recession. How important do you think it is for democracy in general that….. Liberal democracy -national elections are free and fair -voters discuss politics with people they know before deciding how to vote -different political parties offer clear alternatives to one another -opposition parties are free to criticize the government -the media are free to criticize the government -the media provide citi9zens with reliable information to judge the government -the rights of minority groups are protected -the courts treat everyone the same -the courts are able to stop the government acting beyond its authority -governing parties are punished in elections when they have done a bad job -the government explains its decisions to voters -politicians take into account the views of other European governments before making decisions Social democracy -The government protects all citizens against poverty -The government takes measures to reduce differences in income levels Direct democracy -Citizens have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly in referendums 
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